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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ETHA BAKER FLOWERS, AURA
BAKER HORTON, and TULlE
BAKER RA~DALL,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Case No.
V!.

7445

'VRIGHTS, INCORPORATED,
corporation,

a

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to the 11th day of February, 1939, one Allie
C. Baker was the owner in fee simple of the following
described premises situate in Ogden City, Weber County,
State of Utah :
The store building and ground known as 2341
Washington Avenue, Ogden, Utah, with lot extending to Kiesel Avenue and described as follows:
1
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Beginning 22 feet South from the Northeast
corner of Lot 9, Block 32, Plat ''A'', Ogden City
Survey, and running thence South 22 feet; thence
West 330 feet ; thence North 22 feet; thence East
330 feet to the place of beginning, subject to right
of way over the West 25 feet now used as Kiesel
Avenue.
On or about the 11th day of February, 1939, the
said Allie C. Baker and the defendant entered into,
executed, and delivered a certain agreement of lease,
wherein and whereby the said Allie C. Baker, as lessor,
did lease unto the defendant, as lessee, the above described premises for a term of five years commencing
on the 15th day of February, 1939, and ending on the
15th day of February, 1944. (R.:OOO, 011, 019.) The
agreement of lease was introduced in evidence pursuant
to pre-trial order dated November 14, 1949 (R-019)
and is designated herein as plaintiffs' "EXHIBIT A."
The said agreement contains the following !paragraphs
of critical importance in this action:
''And said lessee, in consideration of the leasing of the premises aforesaid by the said lessor
to it, covenants to pay as the annual rental for
said premises three (3) per cent of the total sales
volume of the lessee, provided,.however, that the
lessee agrees to pay a minimum rental of Two
thousand, nine hundred and forty Dollars ($2,940.00) per year, payable in monthly installments
of Two hundred and forty-five Dollars ($245.00)
each, monthly in advance on the 15th day of each
and every month, commencing with the 15th day
of February, 1939. ''
"It is understood and agreed that the books of
said lessee will be open for inspection to verify

2
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·the annual sales volume reported by it.''
"And the lessee hereby covenants as follows:
"That neither the lessee nor its legal representative will let or underlet said premises, or
assign this lease, without the written assent of
the lessor first had and obtained thereto, except
that said lessee may sublet space in the said
premises to departments selling other lines of
merchandise than those offered for sale by the
lessee, that is to say, women's coats, suits, furs
and dresses. * * * ''
"It is further mutually understood and agreed
by and between the parties hereto that the lessee
may have the option of extending this lease for
an additional period of five years, upon terms and
conditions to be stipulated at that time by the
lessor and the lessee." ( R-006, 007.)
On or about the 25th day of June, 1941, Allie C.
Baker and the defendant entered into, executed, and
delivered an agreement of extension of lease, which
was introducd in evide.nce pursuant to pre-trial order,
and is known and designated herein as plaintiffs' ''EXHIBIT B.'' By said agreement of extension of lease,
the agreement of lease, Exhibit A, was extended for a
period of 5 years from February 15, 1944 (the termination date of the original term), to February 15, 1949. The
{jxtension agreement provided as follows:
'' * * * it is agreed by and between Lessor
and Lessee that said Lease of said premises be
and the same is hereby extended for said additional period of five years, so tha.t the sawe will
('xpire on February 15, 1949, provided, however,
that the same terms, conditions, covenants and
agreements, including the payment of the same
3
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rrwnthly rent as said lease provided shall continue
with like effect to all legal intents and purposes
as if contained in new lese, except that the Lessee
agrees that if during such extended period the
annual general taxes levied by and !payable to
Weber County, State of Utah, are increased in
any year of such extended period over what said
taxes are now, then the Lessee agrees to pay such
increase as and when the same a:re payable, and
such payment shall be construed to be additional
rental for the period of any such year.'' (R-009,
010.)
The defendant occupied and used the leased premises for a period of ten years, commencing February 15,
1939, and terminating February 15, 1949. (R-001, 011.)
During the original term created by Exhibit A and the
extended term created by Exhibit B, a retail merchandising store was conducted on said premises by the defendant. During defendant's occupancy of the premises,
there was sold therefrom women's wearing apparel,
including women's coats, suits, furs, dresses, shoes,
and hats. (Pre-trial order; R-002, 011, 020, 021.)
Subsequent to the execution and delivery of the
aforesaid agreement of lease, Exhibit A, and the aforesaid extension agreement of lease, Exhibit B, the said
Allie C. Baker conveyed by warranty deed the above
described premises unto plaintiffs, subject, however, to
the occupancy by defendant of said premises under the
aforesaid agreements; and subject, also, to the terms,
conditions, covenants, and stipulations of said agreements, and each of them. (R-001, 011.)
4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The said Allie C. Baker died on the 31st day of
:Jiarch, 1945, intestate, leaving as her sole heirs-at-law
the plaintiffs herein, who are the daughters of said
decedent. Said plaintiffs, under the statutes of descent
and succession of the State of Utah, and particularly
under the mandates of Section 104-4-5, Utah Code, 1943,
succeeded to all of the right, title, claim and interest
of the said Allie C. Baker, deceased, in and to the
above described leased premises, and in and to the
rights, interests, and property of the said Allie C.
Baker, as lessor, in and to said agreement of lease,
Exhibit A, and in and to said agreement of extension
of lease, Exhibit B. Plaintiffs are now the owners in
fee simple of the above described leased premises, and
the absolute owners of all of the rights, titles, claims,
and interests of the said Allie C. Baker, deceased,
created by and existing under the aforesaid agreements,
Exhibits A -and B, and each of them. (R-001, 002, 011.)
The defendant attorned to and recognized the plaintiffs as the owners ·of the above described leased premises and all of the rights, interest, and property of
the said Allie C. Baker, deceased, created and existing
under the aforesaid agreements, Exhibits A and B.
(R-002, 011.)
Pursuant to stipulation of counsel and the pre-trial
order entered herein (R-019, 022), it was agreed that
the volume of sales made by defendant from the premises under lease to it for each of the years from February 15, 1939, to February 15, 1949, was as follows:
5
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"For the period from February 15,
1939, to December 31, 1939______________ $

43,952.12

For the period from January 1,
1940 to December 31, 1940________________

57,044.05

For the period from January 1,
1941, to December 31, 194L_____________

75,984.43

For the period January 1, 1942,
to December 31, 1942________________________

123,550.52

For the period January 1, 1943,
to December 31, 1943________________________

177,184.01

For the period January 1, 1944,
to December 31, 1944------------------------

180,134.12

·For the period January 1, 1945,
to December 31, 1945------------------------

188,732.61

For the period January 1, 1946,
to December 31, 1946________________________

146,619.52

For the period January 1, 1947,
to December 31, 1947------------------------

142,655.38

For the period January 1, 1948,
to December 31, 1948________________________

149,843.28

For the period January 1, 1949,
to February 15, 1949·-----------------------

15,226.53

.TotaL ......................$1,300,926.57''
(R-020.)
It was further stivulated and agreed by counsel
and confirmed by the pre-trial order that the total sales
made and effected by the sublessee of the shoe department for each of the years from February 15, 1939, to
February 15, 1949, were as follows :
6
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''~I arch

25, 1939, to December 31, 1939......$ 9,298.90
January 1, 1940, to December 31, 1940.... 9,089.26
January 1, 1941, to December 31, 1941.... 28,272.51
January 1, 1942, to December 31, 1942.... 60,869.26
January 1, 1943, to December 31, 1943.... 75,733.46
January 1, 1944, to Decen1ber 31, 1944____ 99,103.00
January 1, 1945, to December 31, 1945.... 105,240.42
January 1, 1946, to December 31, 1946.... 134,038.77
January 1, 1947, to December 31, 1947.... 132,874.74
January 1, 1948, to December 31, 1948.... 153,339.59
January 1, 1949, to February 15, 1949____ 14,760.18
TotaL ______________________ $822,620.09''
(R-020.)

It was further stipulated and agreed by counsel
and confirmed by the pre-trial order that the total sales
made and effected by the sublessee of the millinery
department for each of the years from February 15,
1939, to February 15, 1949, \vere as follows:
''February 15, 1939, to December 31, 1939 $ 7,288.66
January 1, 1940, to December 31, 1940___ _ 7,525.23
Jannary 1, 1941, to December 31, 1941. ... 9,682.79
January 1, 1942, to December 31, 1942 ___ _ 14,555.59
January 1, 1943, to December 31, 1943 ___ _ 21,091.91
January 1, 1944, to December 31, 1944... . 18,609.90
January 1, 1945, to December 31, 1945... . 14.804.97
January 1, 1946, to December 31, 1946 ___ _ 12,845.24
January 1, 1947, to December 31, 1947.... 12,532.87
January 1, 1948, to December 31, 1948_ __ _ 11,535.95
January 1, 1949, to February 15, 1949 ___ _
857.62

TotaL----------------------$131,330. 73''
(R-021.)
7
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It was further stipulated and agreed by counsel
and confirmed by the pre-trial order that the defendant
paid unto plaintiffs or their predecessor in interest the
following amounts:
'' (a) The sum of $29,400.00 as the basic
rental for the 1period commencing
February 15, 1939, to February 15,
1949, at the rate of $245.00 per
month ------------------------------------------------------$29,400.00
(b) The sum of $3,997.08 on May 21,
1945, as additional percentage
rental due for the period commencing February 15, 1939, and ending
ending December 31, 1944____________________ 3,997.08
(c) The sum of $2,721.97 on January
14, 1946, as additional percentage
rental due for the year 1945________________

2,721.97

(d) The sum of $1,358.59 on February
17, 1947, as additional percentage
rental due for the year 1946________________ 1,358.59
(e) The sum of $1,341.70 on January
27, 1948, as additional percentage
rental due for the year 1947________________ 1,341.70
(f) The sum of $1,555.30 on January
31, 1949, as additional percentage
· rental due for the year 1948________________ 1,555.30
(g) Total payments made by defendant
to plaintiffs and their predecessor
in interest --------------------------------------------.. $40,374.64''
''That in addition to said payments defendant
on or about April 11, 1949, tendered to plaintiffs
the sum of Two Hundred Eleven and 80/100
($211.80) Dollars as.the balance of rentals due for
the 1period commencing January 1, 1949, and
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ending February 15, 1949, which payment plaintiffs refused to accept.'' (R-021.)
The retail sales for the ten-year period made from
the demised premises totaled as follows :
Coats, suits, furs, and dresses ________________ $1,300,926.57
(R-020.)
Shoes -----------------------------------------------------------(R-020.)

822,620.09

Hats -------------------------------------------------------------- 131,330.73
(R-021.)
TotaL _______________________ $2,254,877 .39
The plaintiffs allege and claim that they were entitled to receive as rental three (3) per cent of the total
sales aforesaid, or the sum of $67,646.32. The original
agreement and sublease provided for a minimum rental of $245.00 per month, or $2,940.00 per year. In the
year 1939, three (3) per cent of the sales of merchandise
from said premises was $1,816.19. The basic rental for
that year (10¥2 months) was $2,695.00. The defendant,
therefore, became liable under the terms of the lease,
according to plaintiff's claim, for the difference between
said basic rental of $2,695.00 and the percentage rental
of $1,816.19, or the sum of $878.81.
For the year 1940, the percentage rental computed
on sales merchandise from the said premises amounted
to $2,209.76. The difference between the basic rental of
$2,940.00 (12 months) for said year and the percentage
rental is the sum of $730.24, for which the defendant,
according to plaintiffs' claim, is liable.
9
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Plaintiffs assert, therefore, that there accrued in
favor of them under said agreement of lease and extension agreement the following amounts:
Three (3) per cent of the total sales
volume for the 10-year period ________________ $67,646.32
878.81
Balance 1939 minimum rentaL______________________
730.24
Balanc"e 1940 minimum rentaL____________________
Total rental due----------------------------------------$69,255.37
Payment was made by defendant of. ___________ $40,374.64
Balance due plain tiffs ______________________________ $28,880. 73
for which judgement was prayed.
In the course of the operation of the retail merchandising business conducted on the demised premises, the
defendant sublet space therein to persons, who, thereafter, respectively carried on the business of selling
shoes and women's millinery. (R-013.) The defendant
did not account to the plaintiffs, nor to their predecessor,
for any sales of shoes and millinery made on the demised
premises, and has contended that said sales were not of
a nature as to be included in its gross sales volume for
the purpose of computing percentage rental due plaintiffs under their lease agreement. (R-013, 014.) The
plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that the said sales
of shoes and hats constituded part of the sales volume
of defendant,· and that it was its duty to account to
plaintiffs and their predecessor, and to pay the required
percentage rental thereon.
At the trial, the plaintiffs made tender of proof
thro.ugh a witness, then on the stand, (R-047) of the
10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

following nature: The defendant, during the ten year~
covered by the lease and extension agreement, treated
the sales made in the hat department and in the shoe
departrnent as its own sales, inasmuch as all cash sales
\vere .paid to, and were taken into, the accounts of defendant. (R-047.) All credit sales made by these departments were taken into and absorbed by the defendant,
and the debtors, or purchasers, were billed by the defendant. (R-048.) The defendant assumed all credit risks
in connection with credit sales of hats and shoes, and
the operators of the hat and shoe departrnents did not
assume such risk. (R-048.) The settlements made by the
defendant and the operators of these two departments
were made on the basis of the gross sales, on a percentage basis including credit sales, without respect as to
the collectibility...A.ny losses sustained on those accounts
were losses sustained by the defendant. (R-048.) In
the treatment of the employees of the shoe department,
particularly under the arrangement with a certain Mr.
Ber1 A. Rich, these employees were car-ried on the payrolls of defendant. When the Federal withholding
tax law came into operation, the defendant withheld the income tax on these employees' pay and remitted the withheld tax to the United States Collector of
Internal Revenue. (R-048.) Defendant 1paid the Workmen's Compensation premium on the employees of the
~hoe department. (R-048.) It withheld and remitted the
Old Age Benefit tax from the pay of the employees of
shoe department, and it also paid the employer's Old
Age Benefit tax upon said employees' pay. (R-048.)
11
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Likewise, the defendant paid the Utah Unemployment
Insurance tax on the pay of these employees. The court
sustained the objection of defendant to this evidence
and refused to allow plaintiffs to make proof of the
foregoing facts. (&-049.)
Also, at the trial, the plaintiffs introduced in evidence (R-038) a letter dated June 16, 1941, addressed
to plaintiffs' predecessor in interest, Mrs. Allie C.
Baker, and signed by Mr. C. Angus Wright, president
of defendant. (Plaintiffs' exhibit C.) Said letter reads
as follows:
''Agreeable with our conversation of a few
days ago I have had Judge Howell prepare a lease
extension as per our conversation, and I enclose
herewith a copy of the same which you may
retain for your personal file. The original is in
Judge Howell's office where you may execute
it and where the notary can notarize all of our
signatures.
''Upon execution of this lease extension we
will proceed with the plans for rather extensive
improvements the cost of which we will be willing
to pay.
''Kind personal regards.''
At the conclusion of plaintiffs' case 1n chief, the
defendant moved the Court for judgment of non-suit
and dismissal upon the following grounds: .
'' 1. That plaintiffs' complaint, constructed
(sic) in the light of the stipulation of facts
embodied in the pre-trial order, does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
"2. That no evidence has been introduced
herein that shows, or tends to show, that defeend-
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ant is indebted to plaintiffs in any sum \VhatsoeYer. save and except the sum of $211.80, which
amount defendant has heretofore tendered plaintiffs, and plaintiffs have refused, and which
amount defendant here and now again tenders
to plaintiffs.
''On the contrary, the testimony conclusively
shmYs that defendant's obligation to plaintiffs
was, and is, for the payment of rentals based on
sales by it as .provided in the lease; and, save
and except for said sum of $211.80, the defendant
has paid to plaintiffs, or their predecessor in
interest, all rentals payable under said lease.''
(R-050.)
The Court granted said rnotion and, thereupon, there
was signed, entered and filed on the lOth day of December, 1949, judgment of non-suit and dismissal of this
. action. (R-024, 025.) The plaintiffs, in due course,
perfected their appeal from said judgment to the
Supreme Court.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT OF LEASE DATED
FEBRUARY 11, 1939, AND THE AGREEMENT OF EXTENSION OF LEASE DATED JUNE 25, 1941, IMPOSED
UPON THE DEFENDANT THE DUTY OF ACCOUNTING
TO THE PLAINTIFFS FOR ITS TOTAL SALES VOLUME
DURING THE TERM OF THE LEASE AS EXTENDED,
AND TO PAY TO PLAINTIFFS AS RENTAL FOR THE
LEASED PREMISES THREE (3) PER CENT OF SAID
TOTAL SALES VOLUME.
A. The total sales volume of defendant during the term
of the lease as extended included not only the sales
of women's coats, suit, furs, and dresses, but, also
the sales of hats and shoes.
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B. Tbe trial court committed error in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint and entering judgment of non-suit
because the original agreement of lease and agreement of extension of lease, when correctly construed
and int·erpreted, sustain plaintiffs' claim for unpaid
rental based on a percentage of sales of millinery
and shoes.
1. APPLICABE RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

AND INTERPRETATION.
2. THE RELATIONSHIP OF LESSOR AND
LESSEE AS REVEALED BY THE LEASE.
3. THE LEASE WAS A CREATION OF THE
DEFENDANT AND SHOULD BE CONSTRUED STRICTLY AGAINST IT.
4. SUBLEASING AUTHORITY CONTAINED
IN A LEASE MUST NOT BE USED BY
THE LESSEE AS AN INSTRUMENT TO
REDUCE RENTALS PAYABLE TO THE
LESSOR.
5. TOTAL SALES VOLUME OF THE LESSEE.
6. SPACE AND DEPARTMENTAL OPERA-

TIONS IN RETAIL STORES.
Succinctly stated, plaintiffs' claim for additional
rentals under Exhibits A and B (For convenience Exhibits A and B will hereafter be designated "LEASE.")
is based upon the contention that the sales~ made during
the term of the orginal lease and extended term thereof
by the shoe and hat departments operated on the
leased premises, were part of the total sales volume of
defendant. Reference is made to the provisions of Exhibit A, S'pecifically quoted above. It is about these
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prov1s1ons that this controversy revolves. Differences
arose between the plaintiffs and defendant as to the
meaning of the phrase "* * * to pay as the annual rental
for said premises three (3) per cent of the total sales
Yolume of the lessee,'' and the paragraph of the orginal
lease, prohibiting the assignment of the lease, or the
letting or under-letting of said premises, without the
written assent of lessor first had and obtained thereto,
''except that said lessee may sublet space in the said
premises to departments selling other lines of merchandise than those offered for sale by the lessee; that is to
say, women's coats, suits, furs, and dresses.''
It is, therefore, manifest that the decision in this
case will largely depend upon the construction and interpretation given these provisions of the lease.
1. Applicable rules of construction and interpretation.

In determining the correct meaning of the disputed
phrases and provisions of the lease, there are certain
rules for construction and interpretation of contracts
which are not only helpful, but, also, of pertinent relevance. The rules, as exemplified in the following quotations, are useful as implements of interpr'etation:
''The whole instrument must be- considered,
and all its terms looked to to ascertain the true
intent of the parties, and when this intent can
be ascertained it must prevail, although it may
be contrary to the strict letter of the contract.
This rule is elementary* * * " (/XL Furniture
and Carpet Installment House v. Berets, 52 Utah
454, 91 Pac. 279.)
"However, the duty of the courts in interpreting leases and other written instruments, is to get
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the real intentions of the parties, and in so doing
the court considers the writing, and, also, the
circumstances of the parties. * * * When possible the court should give effect to all words
and clauses of the lease and construe the lease
as a whole." (Powerine Co. v. Russell's, Inc.,
103 Utah 441, 135 Pac. ( 2d) 906.)
''A lease must be construed as a whole, and
whether an ambiguity is patent or latent, the
intentions of the parties is to be ascertained from
a consideration of the entire instrument, and
not from particular part or parts. Particular
clauses and terms must be considered in connection with the rest of the lease; and the absence
of material provisions must be considered. All
clauses, terms and provisions of the instrument,
and every word in it, should be construed together
and given effect, if this may be done consistently
with rules of law and the intentions of the parties." ( 31 C.. J. 8., Evidence Sec. 231e, pp. 852853.)

''There is still another element to which the
courts, under certain circumstances, have recourse, in case the language in a contract is
ambiguous or uncertain, which is: that where
one of the parties, or one who is directly interested in the subject matter of the contract, has
prepared it and has used language which is
ambiguous or uncertain in its meaning, the language will be construed most strongly against the
party who has used the ambiguous and uncertain
language. * * * Although the rule just stated
is not one of controlling influence, yet, when
the evidence, as in this case, shows that a lawyer,
who is an interested party, prepared the contract
for the defendants, who are laymen, the rule has
special application." (Emphasis supplied.) (Penn
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8tar lllining Co. v. Lyman, 64 Utah 343, 231 Pac.
107.) (See also: Read v. Forced Underfin.ug
Corp., 82 Utah 529, 26 Pac. (2d) 325; Jordan v.
Jladsen, 69 Utah 112, 252 Pac. 570.)
''The lease must be construed as a whole, and
such a construction placed upon it as will render
all clauses harmonious and consistent. Different
provisions dealing with the same subject matter
are to be read together and, where possible, all
language used should be given a reasonable
meaning. The intention of the parties is to be
ascertained from a consideration of the entire
instrument. Every covenant is to be expounded
with regard to its context. (3 Thompson on Real
Property (Perm. Ed.) Sec. 1112, p. 115.)
''Leases are to be construed as are other contracts, and so far as uncertainties are concerned,
according to the nature of the specific obligation
under consideration. The code sections already
referred to are all sufficient for the purposes
of the present case. Executory contracts are, as
a rule, specific, reciprocal, executory obligations.
In a lease, uncertainty as to the obligations of
the landlord, or as to those of the tenant, may
result from erroneous or incomplete expressions.
While it is to be borne in mind that the intentions
of the ;parties are to be ascertained from a consideration of the entire instrument, it is nevertheless true that the nature of each covenant
must be examined when it is necessary to know
which party is the promissor or obligor thereunder. Such a one may be found to be the
lessee * * * where the original rental obligation
was involved, or it may be the lessor * * * where
questions were involved as to the length of the
terms of the leases." (Earl Ranch Co., Ltd .. v.
Marchus, 60 C. A. (2d) Cal.) 379, 140 Pac. (2d)
891.)
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''A lease will be given a reasonable construction where that is possible rather than an unreasonable one. The court will likewise endeavor
to give a construction most equitable to the
parties, and which will not give one of them an
unfair or unreasonable advantage over the other.
A construction leading to an absurd, harsh,
or unreasonable result should be avoided if possible." ( 31 C. J. S., Evidence, Sec. 231d, p. 852.}
''Where a question of rent is involved, any
ambiguity in such covenant as this ought to be
resolved against the tenant, on the theory that
rent is a normal and natural incident to occupancy* * *." (Reporting Corporation v. Deshere,
4 N.J. Miscel. 65, 131 Atlantic 635.) (See also:
52 C. J. S., Evide'nce, Sec~ 466b, P~ 208.)
There is no uncertainty as to these rules of interpretation; the problem always arises in applying them,
and such problem exists in the instant case.
2. The relationship of lessor and lessee as revealed by
the lease.

I

The lease, on its face, is informatory of the relationship between the parties thereto at the time the !premises
were leased by Mrs. Baker, the plaintiffs' predecessor in
interest, to the defendant. Mrs. Baker was the owner
of real property located in the heart of the retail shopping district (2341 Washington Avenue), in Ogden,
Utah.. Upon it was erected a store building suitable for
retail merchandising. The lease covered the real estate
and improvements. It was, therefore, not a mere contract of occupancy of the building, but created a definite
- term of years. (32 Am. Jur. - Landlord and Tenant Sec. 61, 62; pp. 77, 78.) The lessee, therefore, became

I
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the owner of a leasehold interest in real property, and
}.Irs. Baker held the reversionary interest therein.
(Ibid.) Plaintiffs, by conveyance and operation of the
law of succession and descent, succeeded to Mrs. Baker's
mvnershi,p, interests, and rights.
As consideration for the lessor leasing the premises
to it, the defendant agreed to pay an annual rental of
three (3) per ce:at of its total sales volume, and further
agreed to pay a 1ninin1um rental of $2,940.00 per year,
payable in installments of $245.00 each, monthly in advance, on the 15th day of each and every month commencing with the 15th day of February, 1939. This
rental covenant is of most important concern in determining the intentions of the parties to the lease.
The defendant agreed to pay as rental three (3) per
cent of its total sales volume, with a subsidiary guaranty
that under all ·circumstances it would he liable for a
Elinimum rental of $2,940.00 per year. The requirement
of minimum rental was, therefore, a ''floor'', which
guaranteed the lessor this minimum. compensation for
the use by defendant of the lessor's real estate, regardless of the size or quantum of the sales volume of defendant. This agreement differs from many other ''percentage leases" which have exhibited themselves in
the law reports. Many of the litigated percentage leases
involved agreements of the lessee whereby it agrees to
pay the lessor a stated sum ~er month, or year, as rental,
and then provided that the lessor will be entitled to a
percentage of the gross sales of the lessee over and
above a stated amount of sales, which, at the percentage
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stated, would equal the minimum rental. In the case at
bar, it is obvious that the rental was to be based upon a
ercentage of defendant's total volume of sales. This
~ust have been one of the animating motives in leasing
the premises. As a matter of precaution to protect
the lessor, a minimum rental was agreed upon by the
parties, but the lease, on its face, shows that the lease
was consummated on the basic understanding that the
lessor would participate in defendant's prosperity. Due
to the form of this rental covenant, there is a definite
and specific inference that the !parties did not consider
the minimum rental prescribed as the fair and reasonable rental value of the premises. In order to meet
taxes, upkeep, and other charges upon the leased real
estate, the lessor demanded a fixed rental, but the parties must have intended that the fair and reasonable
rental value o.f the property would be dependent upon
the success of defendant's merchandising venture. This
feature of the lease cannot be overlooked in the interpretation of the agreement. The lessor, after having
received a guaranty for a fixed rental which would pay
the carrying charges on the property, was willing to
take the risk in securing the true and reasonable rental
value of the property. She became, therefore, not only
a lessor, but also occupied a position closely related to
that of a cestui que trust. . There came into existence a
quasi-fiduciary relationship between plaintiffs and their
predecessor in interest and the defendant.
Percentage leases create a relationship which is
sui generis. In 35 Mich. Law Review} P. 95, is found the
20
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following comment:
'' * * * The leasing arrangement should not be
construed to establish any of the standard, well
recognized legal relations such as the landlord
and tenant relationship, the licensor-licensee relationship, or the partnership relation. To classify it under any of these heads is to hold that
certain rules of law are applicable which defeat
the function of such agreement. Rather, it seems
that the relation should be regarded as sui
generis. So far as general1principles are applicable at all, they should be the ordinary principles
of the law of contract.''
The case of Garden Suburbs Golf and Country Club
v. Pruitt, 24 Southern (2d) 989; 156 Fla. 825; 170 A. L. R.
1107, contains this pertinent statement:
''A percentage lease permitting the lessee to
sublet portions of the premises, or concessions,
or privileges therein, does not permit the lessee
to deprive the lessor of a percentage of the gross
receipts which would accrue from main revenueproducing facilities. In other words, this subleasing authority cannot be used to reduce the
percentage rental which would ordinarily accrue
to the lessor from the revenue-producing facilities
ordinarily operated by the lessee.''
The following statement is taken from the annotation contained in 174 A. L. R~ 1115:
"Percentage leases are admittedly in the nature of agreements sui generis, and while they
are generally governed by the rules and law
applicable to ordinary leases, the peculiar features of provisions making rental dependent in
some way upon a percentage of income from
business on the leased premises, frequently offer
21
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difficult and technical questions of construction.
• • • The classification of the so-called leasings
of space in the establishment of a business, such
as a department store, is difficult, but the cases
seem in agreement that they are not, in a strict
legal sense, leases.''
While dealing primarily with the relationship between a department store owner and the lessee of a
department therein, the case of Man;elle, Inc. v. Sol &
S. Marcus Co., 274 Mass. 469; 175 N. E. 83; 74 A. L. R.
1012, considers the relationship established by percentage leases as follows:
''It was not merely or chiefly a lease. It was
primarily an agreement establishing a commercial relationship of some intimacy, and important
to both parties. * * * It is obvious * * * that
their relations must be close and intimate, and
involve no small degree of mutual confidence
and harmonious contact. * * * The agreement
and lease signed by the parties manifestly is
much more than a lease, in the ordinary significance of the word. It is an instrument designed
to regulate, so far as reasonably possibly might
be foreseen, the manifold relations and points
_of possible friction arising out of the inevitable,
close vhysical situation between the business of
the plaintiff and the business of the defendant."
The authorities, therefore, establish that there came
into existence a relationship of more cogent force than
that of landlord and tenant which the court should consider in arriving at its decision. The face of the lease,
without considering any surrounding facts and circum·
stances, demanded that the defendant exercise the utmost good faith in functioning under the lease. Due
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to the ~ercentage rental arrangement and the defendant's covenant,
"It is understood and agreed that the books
of said lessee will be open for inspection to
verify the annual sales volume reported by it.''
(Exhibit A, R-006.)
the defendant became a quasi trustee, and its operations
and functioning under the lease are subject to strict and
critical examinat]on and analysis. It deliberately chose
to place itself in this position by its :agreement to pay
t~1e lessor a percentage of i~ total sales volume for the
use of lessor's property. Appellants submit that, in interpreting the controversial terms of the lease, the
court should keep constantly before it the fact that the
defendant, as a quasi trustee, occupied a confidential
relationship towards the lessor.
3. The lease was a creation of the defendant and should
be construed strictly against it.

Plaintiffs' Exhibit C, heretofore set forth in full,
shows that the agreement of extension of lease was
drafted by the counsel for defendant, who was also the
Secretary of defendant. The original lease, plaintiff's
Exhibit A, was also executed by Judge Howell, as Secretary of the company. The agreement of extension of
lease specifically adopted all of the terms, conditions,
covenants, ~and agreements as contained in the original
lease, and declared that the same "shall continue with
like legal effect to all legal intents and purposes as if
contained in new lease." It is but a fair inference that
Exhibit A was ~also drafted by the defendant and was
the creature of defendant. Reference is made to the
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case of Penn Star Mining Co. Vr Lyman, supra, wherein
the court affirmed the rule that, where the contract is
ambiguous or uncertain and it has been prepared by
one of the parties who used language in it which is
ambiguous and uncertain in its meaning, the language
will be construed strictly against the party who used
ambiguous or uncertain language. The decision emphasizes the fact that this rule is particularly applicable
where it is shown that a lawyer, who is an interested
party, prepared the contra@t. While plaintiffs recognize
that such rule is not vositively controlling, it is also
submitted that it is of peculiar applicability in this
case. Plaintiff's Exihibit C indicates the confidential
relationship that existed between the lessor and lessee
at the time the extension agreement was drafted and
executed. Attention is invited to the fact that this extention agreement is dated June 25, 1941, or nearly three
years before the expiration of the original term of the
lease, and only a few months in excess of two years
from the date of the original lease. Under such circumstances, there is a high degree of justice in applying
this rule of construction in this case.
4. Subleasing authority contained in a lease must not
be used by the lessee as an instrument to reduce rentals
payable to the lessor.

The case of G'arden Suburbs Calf and Country Club
v. Pruitt, cited above, announces a fundamental rule in
the construction and interpretation of the authority
sometimes contained in percentage leases which permits
the lessee to sublease parts of, or space in, the leased
24
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

premises. This subleasing authority cannot ·be used by
the lessee to reduce the percentage rental "'hich would
ordinarily accrue to the lessor from revenue-producing
facilities ordinarily operated by the lessee.
A striking exam~ple of the application of this rule
is found in Cissna Loan Co. v. Barron, 149 Washington
386; 270 Pac. 1022. In that case the lessor was entitled
to a monthly rental to be computed on a percentage of
the gross sales of the ''department store business conducted and maintained'' by the lessee in ''said building" under lease. The lessee moved two important departments to an adjoining building not owned by the
lessor. In an action to recover the percentage rental,
the lessor contended that it was entitled to a percentage
of the lessee's gross sales, whether made in the leased
building or in the adjoining building. The lessee denied
liability on sales made by the departments operating
in the adjoining building. The court wrote:
"Appellant [lessee] is conducting one business only, that of 'The Fair Department Store',
and is bound to pay rent for respondent's
[lessor's] building the agreed percentage of the
gross sales of the 'said department store business'
* * * . We are clearly of the opinion that respondent is entitled to receive the agreed percentage
on the gross sales made from the departments
located in the McArthur [adjoining] building."
The lease required payment of a percentage of gross
sales of the department store business maintained by
the lessee in "said building." Sales from the departments in the adjoining building were not in "said building" under lease. It is obvious that, if the lease had

25
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

been literally construed, the sales in the adjoining building would not have been included in the lessee's gross
sales. However, the court did not approve a course of
practice by the lessee which had the effect of reducing
·the lessor's rental "which would ordinarily accrue to
the lessor from the revenue-.producing facilities ordinarily operated by the lessee.'' The case is an affirmation of this general principle.
A most interesting and well-considered decision on
this point is that of S. P. Dunham & Co. v. 26 East State
Street Development Co., 134 N.J. Equity 237; 35 Atlantic (2d) 40, 49. Summarized, the facts of this case are:
A lessor leased to a lessee certain buildings for the
operation of a department store. The lease contemplated that the lessor might not be able to secure an
outstanding title to one of the several buildings under
lease, and provision was made in the lease whereby the
lessor would be relieved of delivery of possession of said
building in the event of its inability to secure the outstanding title, with a further provision that the basic
rental would then be reduced. The lessor did not secure
the outstanding title and, accordingly, was not able to
place the lessee in peaceable possession of the building.
The lessee, however, secured a direct lease from the
owners of the building and used it in the operation of
its store. The agreement between the lessor and the
lessee provided a rental to be 1paid by the lessee to the
lessor based on a percentage of gross sales made by
the lessee with a prescribed minimum. The lessor asserted the right to a percentage of gross sales made
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by the lessee from the building it, the lessor, failed
to provide the lessee, and which the lessee thereafter
leased directly from the owners. The vital issue in the
case turned upon the meaning of the provision defining
gross sales as the ''total gross selling price of all merchandise sold and the selling price of all service rendered on, and/ or from, and/ or in connection with the
aforesaid department store premises'' contained in the
lease. The court refused to construe the phrase ''in connection with'' as including sales made from the building
which lessor could not, and did not, deliver to the lessor.
But in reaching this conclusion, the court particularly
declared:
''The construction of the provisions of the
lease here eJQpressed is not to be understood to
condone the removal by the claimant of its most
lucrative and remunerative departments from the
demised premises to other premises in the endeavor to diminish the rent to which the defendant is
justly entitled under the covenants of the lease.
The obligation of the complainant to conduct a
general department store business in the demised
premises is implicit throughout the lease. The
evidence discloses that the complainant has
moved its toy and domestic departments '"' '"' '"'.
If the defendant has reason to believe that the
mobilization of departments by the complainant
is operating to the financial disadvantage of the
defendant '"' '"' '"' and, if the parties are unable to
agree upon an equitable adjustment, I shall,
upon terms, empower a master to inquire and
report.'' (Emphasis supplied.)
The decision in Selber Bros. v. N ewstadt's Shoe
Stores, 194 La. 654; 194 S. 579, should also be examined.

27
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The lessee of a part of a building to be used as a shoe
store, under a lease fixing a minimum monthly rental
plus six (6) per cent of the amount of the gross sales
in excess of the minimum rental, which ~previously had
been renewed twice upon the same terms, was charged by
the lessor in a damage action with having wilfully violated one of the implied obligations of the contract of
the lease by changing the character of the business from
that of ·a high-class and fashionable shoe store to that
of a low order of business conducted under another
name, consisting of continuous close-out sales, cheap
brands of shoes, end of the season close-outs, old styles,
and slo'Y-movers brought in from other stores of the
lessee. The court, in this case, said that whether the
lessor, on a percentage lease guaranteeing oa minimum
rental, has cause for complaint when the business is conducted in such way that it will not produce additional
rent consisting of :p·ercentages of gross sales, is a matter
depending largely upon the intention of the parties to
the contract, as expressed in the contract, construed in
the light of the circumstances under which it was made.
In the subsequent appeal, 203 La. 316, 14 S. (2d) 10,
the court conceded that, if a lessee were unable to obtain
an extension or renewal from the lessor in advance of
the expiration date of the last annual lease, it would
be under no obligation to suffer "a large financial loss,
if such would result by continuous and regular operation in the premises until the e~piration of the lease
merely for the sake of providing the lessor with its
customary rental.'' The court considered that the evi-

28
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

dence adduced upon the trial of cause did not sustain
this theory, but, rather, the theory of the lessor, that
it sustained a loss in addition to the required minimum,
monthly rentals for the months in question by the acts
of the lessee in departing from customary methods, in
conducting seasonal sales, and selling undesirable. 'and
inappropriate goods at times and under conditions which
not only did not conform to its previous methods, but
constituted a departure from good practice in the retail
shoe business and thereby effected a change in the
nature of the business, resulting in an unwarranted
reduction in the rentals for the months the business
was continued, and that the lessor was entitled to recover such amounts, as well as those resulting from
the premature abandonment of the premises.
Mayfair Operating Corp~ v. Bessemer Properties;
150 Fla. 132; 7 S. (2d) 342, construed provisions in
the lease of a theater (located in Miami, where business is seasonal and the theatre was admittedly closed
in the summer months in order to maintain a high standard of entertainment), requiring the lessee to :pay as
rental a minimum, monthly amount for a five-year term,
and, in addition thereto, the aount, if any, by which
ten (10) per cent of its gross revenue should exceed
the minimum, and requiring the use of the lessee's "best
efforts to obtain and maintain the highest volume of
business on the premises.'' The court held that, in the
absence of a provision permitting it, the lessee was not
entitled to suspend operation of the theatre during the
summer when there was little business, notwithstanding
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the common law rule to the effect ''a tenant has unrestricted use of the demised premises, barring waste and
illegal use, that is to say, his dominion of the demised
premises for the life of the lease is as absolute as that
of the owner, and he may use it as he desires."
The principle announced and affirmed by these
decisions is of particular cogency in the case at bar. It
is evident from the face of the lease that the parties
thereto contemplated that the defendant would operate
upon the demised premises a ret·ail store, wherein and
wherefrom was to be sold and, in fact, was sold '' women's merchandise," that is to say, female wearing
apparel and all accessories and accouterments. This
fact was manifestly known to the parties to the lease
at the time of its execution, because P·aragraph 3, plaintiff's Exhibit A, specifically provides :
"That neither the lessee nor its legal representative will let or sublet said premises or assign
this lease, without the written consent of the
lessor first had and obtained, except that said
lessee may sublet space in the said premises to
departments selling other lines of merchandise
than those offered for sale by the lessee; that is
to say, women's coats, suits, furs, and dresses."
(Emphasis supplied.)
It must first be noted that the lessee was given permission to ''sublet space in the premises.'' (The word
''space'' is defined by Funk & W agnail's New Standard
Dictionary as "area; expanse.") The authority to
''sublet space'' is set ·against the prohibition against
letting or underletting the "premises." The 'parties
clearly intended that the defendant could not place a
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subtenant in the demised premises, whether that subtenant occupied all of the premises or only a part
thereof. However, the defendant was permitted to allow
the use of ''space in the store'' for the sale of ''other
lines of merchandise '' than that particularly specified.
Clearly, the lease contemplated that the permission to
allow the use of space by others was not an equivalent
to subleasing. The thought comes uppermost that the
permitted arrangement left the defendant in complete
control and direction of the store and of the business
conducted thereon; otherwise, the prohibition against
subleasing would have been rendered futile. The defendant was authorized to allow "space" within the
store to be used by others if the direction of the store
and control of the business conducted therein remained
under the defendant's supervision. This so-called subleasing authority did not permit a splitting off of a
part, or parts, of defendant's business. It was written
into the lease for the purpose of .permitting the operation by others of departments under the defendant's
control, and not for the purpose of subtracting from
the operations of defendant conducted on the demised
premises. If the defendant did not sell millinery and
shoes at the time plaintiffs' Exhibit A was signed, this
provision also permitted the defendant to increase the
size and scope of its business by making •arrangements
satisfactory to it with others to sell such added lines of
merchandise. Such operation would increase and not
decrease the volume of its business. The subletting of
"space in the said premises to departments" is not the
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equivalent of the underletting of the premises which
was definitely prohibited. The subletting of space contemplated a relationship with the ''space'' lessee other
than would have prevailed under customary and usual
subleases. Any other interpretahon or construction of
this provision tproduces a most incongruous situation.
If the contention that the subletting clause permits the
defendant to dismember its business, it is easy to imagine a course of conduct by the defendant which would
entirely destroy and render nugatory the percentage
provision of the lease. The defendant could proceed to
"sublease" space in the store to others and retain for
itself simply a small cubicle or area where it could conduct a small and inferior business for the sale of
women's coats, suits, furs, and dresses. It could thereby
minimize its operations so as to simulate and pretend
the operation of such a business, and at the same time,
build up the other ''departments selling other lines of
merchandise'' by giving them all but a small area of
space. Such interpretation would result in the defendant
paying the lessor only the minimum prescribed rental
of $2,940.00 per year, and entirely emasculate the percentage provision of the lease. It is submitted that such
a construction and interpretation of the lease runs
squarely afoul of the fundamental principle that the
''subleasing authority cannot be used to reduce the percentage rental which would ordinarily accrue to the
lessor from the revenue-producing facilities ordinarily
operated by the lessee.' ' ,
Defendant's interpretation of the lease not only
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violates the rule last above mentioned, but, also, first,
does violence to the positive covenant of the defendant
"to pay as the annual rental for said ,premises three (3)
per cent of the total sales volume of the lessee;" and,
second, completely nullifies the prohibition against subleasing the demised premises. The rules of construction clearly teach that it is the duty of the court to apply
each and every covenant of the lease and not adopt a
construction th~t will nullify an important covenant
thereof. As opposed to defendant's theory, as exhibited
in its answer and in its motion for non-suit and dismissal, is the plaintiffs' contention that the authority to
sublease space in the demised premises was intended
to allow defendant to operate separate departments
under its own direction, but did not render such departments independent from defendant's business. They
would remain and become part and parcel of defendant's operations, and their sales would be and become
part of defendant's total sales volume. Such construction is consistent in that it distinguishes between a
subletting of the store which would result in independent store keepers whose sales would not be defendant'~
sales (This type of subleasing was prohibited.) and the
''subleasing'' of ''space'' for department operations,
the sales of which were defendant's sales. (This type of
arrangement was permitted.) Plaintiff's construction of
the contract reconciles all of its parts and produces a
fair, equitable and consistent whole.
5. Total sales volume of the lessee.
The defendant agreed with the lessor:
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''To pay as the annual rental for said premises three (3) per cent of the total sales volume of
the lessee." (Emphasis supplied.)
Defendant claims that the sales made in the shoe
and millinery department (R-031) were not part of its
sales volume. Oppositely, the plaintiffs' cause of action
is built upon the contention that the sales made by these
departments were sales made by the defendant and
were part of its sales volume, upon which plaintiffs are
entitled to the percentage rental of three (3) per cent.
There is no dispute over the fact that the defendant did
not account to .plaintiffs and to their predecessor in
interest for the sales made in the millinery and shoe
departments, and that it paid no percentage rental on
said sales. This law suit finds its existence in plaintiffs' contention and in defendant's denial of its correctness. The critical words of the covenant appear to
be ''total sales volume of lessee.'' The word ''total'' is
of particular influence. Webster's New International
Dictionary, Second Edition, defines ''total'' as :
''Of, pertaining to or referring to the whole
of a thing, specified or implied, or the entire number of things specified or implied, or the entire
number of things concerned ; not partial, as a
total eclipse or wreck. Comprising or constituting
a whole or the sum of all parts, items, instances,
etc.; entire; as the total amount of revenue, output, disbursements, mileage, or membership.***"
In the case of Glaze v. Hart et al, 225 Mo. Appeal1205;
36 S. W. (2d) 684, 688, the following definition of the
word ''total'' was applied:
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''The word 'total' is defined as whole; undivided, entire; con1plete in degree; utter;
absolute.''
In East Texas Fire Insurance Co. v. Blume et al, 76
Tex. 653; 13 S. \V. 572, 576, the court said:
''The word 'total' means 'all, the whole * * *' ''
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Utah in Intermountain
Title Guaranty Co. v. State Tax Commission, 107 Utah
222; 152 Pac. (2d) /2-1, 726, defined the word "total"
as follows:
"[The statute] is 1plain and unambiguous. It
requires a tax on total premiums. Total is defined
in \\~ebster 's New International Dictionary as
'comprising or constituting a whole; whole; undivided; lacking no part; entire; * * * ' ''
The word "volume'~ is defined by Webster's New
International Dictionary, Second Edition, as:
''A mass; bulk; aggregate; often, a considerable quantity, as a volume of gas, to increase
the total volume of sales."
A careful examination of digests, encyclopedias, and
the classic ''Words and Phrases,'' fails to reveal where
the words ''sales volume'' have received judicial interpretation. However, the dictionary definition of the
words ·are extremely helpful.

Black's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, defines
"sale'' as, "a con tract between two parties, called respectively the 'seller' (or vendor) :and the 'buyer' (or
purchaser), by which the former, in consideration of the
payment or promise of payment of a certain price in
money, transfers to the latter the title and possession
of property." Black cites Arnold v. North American
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Chemical Co., 232 Mass. 196, 122 N. E. 283, 284; and
Faulkner v. Town of South Boston, 141 Va. 517, 127
S. E. 380, 381, as defining the word '' s:ale '' as a contract whereby property is transferred from one person
to another for a consideration of value, implying the
passing of the general and absolute title as distinguished from a s1pecial interest falling short of a complete ovvnership.

· In determining the meaning of the phrase ''total
sales volume of the lessee,'' it should not be torn from
the contract, but should be read and considered in connection with the entire lease agreement. It is manifest,
however, that in using the word "total," the parties
used an all-inclusive word of broad meaning and portent. The word "volume" is also a word of large and
all-embracing content. The parties, therefore, used
words of broad, operative effect. The two words possess
an all-inclusive quality, without limitations. They were
used in a lease by the lessor to the lessee of real property, intended by the parties to be used in the operation of the lessee's retail merchandising business. The
phrase ''total sales volume of the lessee'' has a terrific
impact upon the contract as a whole .. One is struck by
its comprehensive, unlimited meaning when applied to
the basis upon which the rent was to be determined.
The phrase was used in connection with the rent covenant, and "any a1nbiguity in such covenant * * * ought
to be resolved against the tenant on the theory that
rent is a normal and natural incident to occupancy.
* * *" (Reporting Corporation v. Deshere, supra, and
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52 C. J. S., Evidence, Sec. 466b, p. 208, supra.)
Insofar as the lessor is concerned, but one business
was to be conducted upon the leased premises, and that
was the business of the lessee. When the lease speaks
of "subletting" "space" in the said premises to departments selling other lines of merchandise, etc., there is
no declaration in such phrase authorizing the lessee to
dismember its total business. The departmentalizing of
lessee's business was an administrative detail of the
lessee, and was of no concern to the lessor, provided
there was no violation of the subleasing provision of
the lease and defendant did not- use the ''space'' provision as a subterfuge to reduce the ·percentage rental
payable to plaintiffs. One of the primary reasons for
this prohibition against subletting the demised premises
or assigning the lease was to prevent arising the exact
condition defendant now asserts it had the right to
produce. The prohibition was intended to prevent independent business units on the premises whose sales
would not be those of the defendant and which would
make inoperative the percentage provision of the lease.
"Space" operators were permitted because sales by
them were part of defendant's sales volume.
Considering the all-inclusive quality of the phrase
in question-'' total sales volume of the lessee' '-and
the fact that the lease on its face emphasizes the lessee's
responsibility for use and occupancy of the property, the
permission to'' sublease'''' space'' in the store cannot reasonably be considered as authorizing a process diluting
the all-embracing covenant to pay percentage rental on
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the total sales volume. It would, indeed, be a strained
and unnatural interpretation of both the covenant to
pay rent and the "space" clause of the contract, to
affix a meaning to them which would authorize the defendant to destroy, or, at least, render inoperative, the
percentage rental agreement. The broad :and all-inclusive covenant "to pay as the annual rental for said
premises three (3) per cent of the total sales volume
of the lessee'' possesses such driving force as to permeate the whole agreement, ·and any limitations thereon should have been definitely and positively set forth.
The rent covenant should not be weakened by any implications created by other clauses of the contract.
Attention is invited to the fact that the "space" clause
is not part of the rental covenant, but is in Paragraph 3
of the lease (plaintiffs' Exhibit A) and is related to
the prohibition against subleasing. The defendant's contention virtually requires the court to insert in the
contract a provision that limits the operation of the
rental covenant, by providing that the percentage rental
should not be paid on sales made from the demised
premises by operators under the "sp!lce" authorization.
It is submitted that, if the parties intended such proviso,
it should have been written into the contract in affirmative terms, and that the court, under acknowledged
authorities,· cannot insert it. A consistent and reasonable intel"pretation of the phrase, "total sales volume
of the lessee," compels the conclusion that, insofar as
the lessor was concerned, it incl~ded sales made by
''space'' operators.
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6. Space and departmental operations in retail stores.

The ''space'' clause of the lease contemplated arrangements between the lessee and third persons for
the use of certain space in the store for the operation
of departments selling other lines of merchandise than
that of the lessees. In order to understand the operative effect of such "space" leasing, it is well to refer
again to the article in 35 Mich. Law Review, heretofore
cited. The author of this article made the further, additional analysis of these leasing arrangements:
''An important merchandising device, largely
developed within the last fifteen years, is the
'leasing' of certain departments by proprietors
of retail stores to outsiders who agree to operate
them as integral units of the owner's business.
It has been estimated that more than sixty percent of the department stores and more than,
forty-eight percent of specialty stores had leased
departments in 1930.
''Any one or more of several reasons may be
responsible for a particular retailer 'farming out'
a portion of his business. He may be unable to
secure the necessary crupital for establishing a
desired department; he 1nay be unable to obtain
an adequately trained subordinate to manage the
proposed line; his business may not warrant, or
he may be unwilling to assume, the risk of venturing into a new line whose success is not assured;
he may be too far from the fashion market which
dominates the contemplated line, for example
millinery, to be able himself to anticipate the
changing demands of the consumer; or the particular department may not in itself be sufficiently important to justify the store owner's
devoting to it the time necessary for successful
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operation, and yet it is a service which customers
will expect and which can attract them to other
sections of the store.
''There has accordingly developed a typical
arrangement whereby the retail proprietor
'leases' or 'licenses' one or more particular deipartments of his business to an independent individual or firm.
''The term of the lease may not be expected
to exceed five years, though renewal provisions
may make extensions possible. The space is let
for the express purpose of retailing a carefully
enumerated line of goods only, with covenant of
lessee to sell no others and covenant of lessor not
to compete. Strict provisions against assignment
by the lessee are almost certainly to be found.
The rental reserved is usually a percentage of
the gross sales of the department, generally payable monthly like regular rent and probably with
a guaranty of an annual minimum. All receipts .
from sales are generally required to pass through
a cashier furnished by the store."
There has arisen a series of most interesting cases
in defining the relationship of a store owner to department operators therein. Below are quoted excerpts froin
some of the leading opinions on this subject:
"It is true that the agreement is in a certain
sense a lease, but it is more than that. It ~provides
for the carrying on of a joint business. * * *
There is also a joint possession of certain aisles
and approaches to the store * * *. It creates
. such business and fiduciary relations between
the parties as to be more properly denominated
a partnership or quasi- partnership agreement
than a lease." (Milwaukee Boston Store v. J(atz,
153 vVis. 492; 140 N. W. 1038, 1048.)
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A contract betwee1i a deparhnent store owner and
a n1usic publisher gave to the latter "the exclusive license and privileg-e of selling and dealing in sheet
music" upon the pre1nises of the store in a location to
be assigned by the store owner. There was a provision
against assigning or transferring the ''lease or contract'' by the music dealer and he also covenanted he
would not sublet the premises. The court held:
" * * * this contract gives no interest in land.
It is not a lease, but a license; and the use of
those terms which are appropriate and common
in leases cannot change its real nature in. that
respect. * * * There is nothing in this conclusion
which is incopsistent with Sutton v. Goodman,
194 Mass. 389, 80 N. E. 608, upon which the
defendant relies. That case was decided upon
:principles peculiar to leases, and is not to be
taken as affecting the general principles applicable to breach of contracts in general. It has
no application to a case like this." (R. H. White
Co. v. Remick & Co., 198 Mass. 41; 84 N. E. 113.)

A jewelry store owner agreed to furnish the plaintiff ~a show case and shelving for the purpose of conducting a stationery department in the store for the
''privilege'' of which plaintiff agreed to pay a :percentage of the gross sales. Before the expiration of the
contract, the store owner removed his business from
the store and leased it for a dyeing establishment and
a second hand clothing store. The court ~allowed the
plaintiff to recover damages based on the value of the
contract, saying:
"This agreement did not really create the relation of landlord and tenant between the parties.
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* * * The agreement created a business arrangement for the benefit of both parties. The counsel
for the defendant is therefore in error in claiming that the rule of damages to be applied in this
case is that which would have been proper if the
relation of landlord and tenant had existed. * * *
The peculiar nature of this agreement is such
that the only general rule of damages which
could be applied was the value of the agreement
to the plaintiff at the time of its breach." (Dickinson v .. Hart, 142 N.Y. 183, 36 N. E. 801.)
"Without setting forth all the details of all
of the arrangements and agreement between the
Arnold Constable Company and the co-partners,
Little and Noyes, it is evident that it was one of
the not uncommon modern arrangements for the
conduct of separate departments in a general
department store, by turning over an entire department, like shoes and millinery, to someone
familiar with that line of business and in whom
the management has confidence, both as to their
general business acumen and integrity, retaining
general oversight of the business, the business
of the department in question being conducted
so that to the public it is a part of the general
store and under its sole management. * * * Such
arrangements may result in a lease of a part of
a store, or, even if de signa ted as a lease and the
parties as lessor and lessee, the agreement may
he of such a nature that by reason of the trust
and confidence imposed in the so-called lessee it
is something more than a lease * * * . '' ( Gerould
Co. v. Arnold Constable & Co., 65 Fed. (2d;
C. C. A. 1st Cir.) 444.)
Reference is also made to the quotation from the decision in .~.tfarcelle, Inc. v. Sol & 8. Marcus Co., heretofore
cited, for an interesting analysis of the relationship
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between the· store owner ·and "space" or departmental
operator in retail stores.
The exception written in Paragraph 3 of the original lease, plaintiffs' Exhibit A, "that said lessee may
sublet space in the said premises to departments selling other lines of merchandise, etc.,'' should be read
and interpreted against the background of judicial precedent, of which leading and oft-quoted examples are
hereinabove cited: The record is silent as to the relationship between the defendant and the operators of its
millinery and shoe departments, except as hereinafter
discussed in Point II of this brief. However, the provision of the lease must have been written and understood
by the parties thereto, and particularly the defendant,
in the light of the "important merchandising device"
developed in the retail merchandising business, and
operative at the times both plaintiffs' Exhibits A and
B were executed. These judicial interpretations of the
relationship between a store owner and a ''space'' or
department operator interpret this custom and practice
of the retail trade in a variety of circumstances, and
they are of great relevancy in the present discussion.
The defendant admits that it availed itself of the ~au
thority contained within the exception in Paragraph 3,
plaintiffs' Exhibit A, and that millinery and shoes
were sold by "space" operators during the term and
extended term of the lease. Regardless of the e~act
agreements between the defendant and the ''space''
operators, it is manifest that the relationship between
the defendant and the "space" operators must have
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been well within the ambit of these decisions ; otherwise
the ''space'' operators would have been the sublessees
of the demised premises, and such subletting would be
in violation of the primary 1prohibition of Paragraph 3,
plaintiffs' Exhibit A. It is not to be supposed that the
defendant will contend that its arrangements with these
''space'' operators were of such nature as to constitute
the operators as sublessees, and thus making the arrangements in violation of the terms of the lease. Therefore, without any proof de hors the lease, it is evident
that these arrangements were of the pattern demonstrated in the foregoing decisions. In the typical cases,
the ''space'' or departmental operators conducuted their
operations as a part of the store-owner's establishment and under his sole direction. The decisions
show that the strict rules of landlord and tenant can~
not be applied. Whether the arrangements in this case
be considered a lease or a license, it is immaterial,
because, beyond peradventure, the defendant must have
dominated the operations. The departments were operated as an integral part of the defendant's store and,
as the court well stated in the Arnold Constable case
above cited, the defendant retained "general oversight
of the business, the business of the department in question being conducted so that to the public it is a part
of the general store and under its sole management.''
No divorcen1ents of the sales of millinery and shoes
from the defendant's business occurred so as to constitute the sales of millinery and shoes !as separate and
independent operations, and make the defendant the
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landlord and the operators mere tenants. The latter
arrangement w·ould not only have been in violation of the
terms of the lease, but, also would have created an intolerable situation for the defendant. Without supervision
and direction of the policies of these departments by the
defendant, confusion and misunderstanding in the .nature of things would have arisen. There must have
existed a close relationship between the operators and
the defendant-so close, in fact, that the sales of millinery and shoes were an integrated part of defendant's
sales volume. It is submitted that the court, in construing and interpreting the controversial provisions
of the lease, is entitled to, and should take cognizance
of, the relationship between the defendant and the department operators !authorized by the exception permitted in Paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Exhibit A. When
this is done, it will be quickly seen that this ''space"
authority did not separate the sales of millinery and
shoes from the business and sales volume of defendant,
but was an ·authorization to enable the defendant administratively to adjust its operations consistent with
'vhat it deemed expedient and proper. Such authorization did not dilute nor lessen the defendant's sales
\'olume.
CONCLUSION

Considering the face of the lease alone, plaintiffs
sincerely believe that they have demonstrated that the
trial court erroneously interpreted and construed the
same, and that a proper and legal interpretation of the
lease compels the conclusion that the sales of millinery
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and shoes were a part of the sales volume of defendant
and, hence, should have been included in the computation of percentage rental due plaintiffs and their predecessor in interest.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DENYING TENDER OF EVIDENCE MADE BY PLAINTIFFS AS TO THE MANNER AND METHODS PURSUED
BY DEFENDANT IN THE CONDUCT OF ITS BUSINESS
UNDER THE LEASE AND AGREEMENT OF EXTENSION OF LEASE.
1. Evidence of facts and circumstances surrounding
the execution and operation of a written agreement
does not violate the parole evidence rule, and such
evidence is admissible although th·e agreement is
unambiguous.
2. The acts and conduct of a party, when inconsistent
with his present claims, may be shown in evidence
against him. Evidence of defendant's method of
operating millinery and shoe departments were implied admissions that the departments were an
integrated part, of defendant's business and their
sales were part of defendant's sales volume.

At the trial, the plaintiffs made tender of proof of
certain facts 1pertaining to the methods and manner of
operations by defendant of the hat and shoe departments during the term and extended term of the lease.
(R-047, 048.) Upon the conclusion of the offer, the
following colloquy occurred between counsel for the
plaintiffs and the court:
''THE COURT : Let me ask you this question, Mr. Riter. Suppose these lessees had operated entirely independent, they had no arrange4'6
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n1ent - say just for the purpose of argument
here - suppose they had operated entirely independent, had their own cash register and had
their own set-up on everything, would you still
contend their sales came under the terms of the
lease 1''
''A : Yes, I would, under the terms of the
lease, quite frankly."
"THE COURT: Then with that I will sustain
the objection to the evidence if that is your contention.''
"A: "\Vhy certainly I contend that."
"THE COURT: I will sustain the objection."
(R-049.)
The plaintiffs co~tended at the trial, and now contend
on appeal, that the face of the lease, properly and correctly construed and interpreted, entitled them to the
percentage rental upon sales of millinery and shoes.
Notwithstanding plaintiffs' contention in this respect,
they should have been allowed to submit evidence to the
court of the manner and methods pursued by defendant
in operating its business under the lease. Such evidence
would not violate the parol evidence rule, and there was
no necessity of establishing an ,ambiguity in the lease
as a condition precedent for the admissibility of this
evidence. It was evidence of facts and circumstances
surrounding the operation of the lease.
1. Evidence of facts and circumstances surrounding
the execution and operation of a written agreement does
not violate the parol evidence rule, and such evidence is
admissible although the agreement is unambiguous.
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''Parol evidence is admissible to show what
was said and done after as well as before the
execution of the lease in order to indicate what
was intended by the parties to be included as an
appurtenance. Such evidence is not received for
the purpose of varying the terms of the written
instrument, but of arriving at the intention of
the parties with reference to the subject matter
of the lease. Conversations had by appellant
with the lessor and with respondent, together
with evidence of circumstances and occurrences
that will aid the court, may be shown for the purpose of ascertaining whether the things claimed
by the lessee were intended to be included as
appurtenances." (Von Rohr v~ Neely, (California, 1946), 76 c. A. (2d) 713, 173 Pac. (2d) 828.)
"Contracts are to be construed in the light'
of surrounding circumstances; from these alone
are they tangible to sense !and made susceptible
of application and improvement. The law which
imparts to it validity, and which is usually designated by mere words of description, are to be
considered in determining the situation of the
parties, antl in carrying out the contract. These
are external, and imply, when not otherwise understood, the necessity of resorting to outside proof
to render the contract intellible and make it effectual. The introduction of such evidence is no
violation of the rule we have stated, and no impeachment of the written contract, but is in furtherance of and necessary ·to its fair and full
enforcement. * * * Evidence offered not to contradict or vary the terms of a written agreement,
but simply to explain how it is to be carried out,
is admissable.'' Wines & Kimball v~ Stevens ct
Shurtliff, 1 Utah 305; 39 Pac. States Reps. 305.)
''Of course the rule (the parol evidence rule)
even as between the parties to the instrument,
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does not foreclose all parol evidence, but only
such as would change or vary or contradict the
terms of the writing, when such terms are clear
and definite." (Garrett v.. Ellison, 93 Utah 184;
72 Pac. (2d) 449.)
''The parol evidence rule does not preclude
the reception of parol evidence with reference
to a n1atter evidenced by the writing, where such
evidence relates to a matter in pais, or is of such
a character that it does not tend to vary or contradict the written instrument. Thus parol evidenc.e which does not vary or contradict the document under consideration is admissable to establish the connection of the document with the
case, to show matters as to which the instrument
is silent, to explain how an agreement is to be
carried out, to show matters required to be shown
by the -contract, or without which it could not be
performed, to show the manner in which the contract was performed, and whether there was a
breach of contract, and to show a particular mode
of payment or discharge agreed on by the parties." (32 C. J. S. Evidence, Sec. 930.) (Emphasis
supplied.)
The Utah Supreme Court quoted with approval the
language used in the case of Ganson v. Madigan, 15
\Vis. 144:
"Thus, if the language of the instrument is
applicable to several persons; to several parcels
of land, to several species of goods ; to several
monuments, boundaries or lines ; to several writings ; or the terms be vague and general, or have
divers meanings, - in all these and the like
cases, parol evidence is admissible of any extrinsic circumstances tending to show what person
or persons, or what things, were intended by
the party, or to ascertain his meaning in any
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other respect; and this without any infrigement
of the general rule, which only excludes parol
evidence of other language declaring the meaning of the parties than that which is contained
in the instrument itself. * * *" (Bartels v .. Brain,
13 Utah 162; 44 Pac. 715.)
"(3) The truth had finally to be recognized
that words always need interpretation; that the
process of interpretation inherently and invariably means the ascertainment of the association
between words and external objects; and that this
makes inevitable a free resort to extrinsic matters
for applying and enforcing the document." (Wig'more on Evidence, Vol IX, Sec. 2470.)
"This rule [parole evidence], however, is limited in its application to the language of the instrument and does not exclude the light of extrinsic circumstances, if necessary, in order to
understand more perfectly the intent and meaning of the parties. '' ( 20 Am. J ur. Evidence, Sec.
1143, p. 998.) (See also Annotation 17 L. R. A.
274.)
2. The acts and conduct of a party, when inconsistent
with his present claims, may be shown in evidence against
him. Evidence of Defendant's methods of operating millinery and shoe departments were implied admissions that
the departments were an integrated part of defendant's
business and their sales were part of defendant's sales
volume.
"Statements in the nature of admissions are
admissible against a party to a suit for the purpose usually of establishing the fact to which
the statements refer. Admissibility is not dependent upon any tendency to discredit or contradict the testimony of a party, although the statements may be so used." ( l\1alia, State Bank
Com'r, for Use and Benefit of Creditors of North
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Sanpete Bank v. Seeley, 89 Utah 262; 51· Pac.
(2d) 357.)
''Such admissions are competent evidence no
matter when made. The time, place, and circumstance of their n1aking go to the weight, not to the
competency, of the evidence. Being substantive
evidence of a fact in issue, the plaintiff was entitled to have admitted that distinct class or species of eYidence, regardless of whether the original transactions with respect to which admissions
"~ere made were clearly or only slightly supported." (In re ~Eller's Estate, 31 Utah 415; 88
Pac. 338.)
'' . A.n admission may be express or implied; i.
e., it may take place in the form of uttered words
of statement, or in the form of conduct from
which is inferred a belief that would be represented by admissory statement. * * * (b) The
implied admission is reached indirectly, i. e. by
inference from conduct, i. e. a circumstantial inference from some conduct to the supposed mental
state of belief beneath it, this mental state when
defined into words being (more or less loosely)
inconsistent with the party's claim. * * *" (Wigmore on Evidence Vol. IV, Sec. 1052.) (Emphasis
supplied)
"The statements made out of court by a party-opponent are universally deemed admissible,
when offered against him. * * * (b) But when
offered against the party they have additionally,
the same logical status as a witness' self-contradiction. Just as a witness' testimony is discredited when it appears that on another occasion he
has made a statement inconsistent with that testimony, so, also the party-opponent is discredited
when it appears that on some other occasion he
has ·made a statement inconsistent with his .pres-
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ent claim against him. The witness speaks in
court through his testimony only, and hence his
testimony forms the sole basis upon which the
inconsistency of his other statement is predicated. But the party-opponent, whether he, himself, takes the stand or not, speaks always
through his pleadings and through the testimony
of his witnesses put forward to support his pleadings; hence the basis upon which may be predicated a discrediting inconsistency on his part includes the whole range of facts asserted in his
pleadings and in the testimony relied on by him:''
(Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. IV, Sec. 1048.)
''Where a 'party on the trial of an action
advances contentions which are inconsistent with
his prior conduct with relation to the matter in
controversy, such prior conduct may be shown
as being in the nature of an admission." (31 C.
J. S. Evidence, Sec. 291.)
''The evidence which the plaintiff adduced as
to the admissions of the defendant was not adduced nor received to impeach the defendant,
nor to discredit him, nor merely to affect his credibility. It was adduced and was received quite
to the contrary, and as all admissions of a litigant as to a material fact are adduced and received, for the purpose of establishing the truth
of the statements made or the existence of a fact
to which they relate, and on the theory that what
a party, as to a matter of fact, has voluntarily
admitted to be true, may reasonably be taken
as true, especially as to a rna tter adverse to him,
for presumptively a party ordinarily does not
admit as true that which is against him unless
it is true . .And of such probative effect are admissions of matters of fact of a party generally regarded when adverse or disserving and volun-
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tarily made, as to make a prima facie case to the
extent of the subject-matter of the admission,
and to dispense with other proof of the fact so
admitted and is sufficient to support a finding
of fact resting alone on such extrajudicial admission of a party. (3 Jones, Comms. on Evidence, Sec. 1072.) Thus, evidence of admissions
of a party adduced by his adversary in his case
in chief, and as part of it, is received as substantive evidence, as primary evidence of the
fact admitted, and not merely to impreach or discredit the testimony of the declarant.'' (Peterson v. Richards, 73 Utah 59; 272 Pac. 229.)
The facts which the plaintiffs offered to prove
and which the trial court excluded were evidence of the
methods and manner in which the millinery and shoe
departments were operated in defendant's store during
the term and extended term of the lease. Defendant's
acts in this connection were inconsistent with its contention 1alleged in its answer and urged upon argument
of its motion for non-suit and dismissal. These facts
constituted an implied admission ag~inst interest in a
matter germane and relevant to this controversy. They
were material to the issues in the case, and constituted
evidence of vital value to the plaintiffs. It is submitted
that the court committed reversible error in denying
plaintiffs the right to prove these f.acts.
WHEREFORE, the tplaintiffs submit that the
judgment in this action should be reversed and that the
lower court be instructed and directed to grant plaintiffs a new trial.
53
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FRANKLIN RITER,
LAVAR E. STARK,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
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